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The shop seemed to be full of all manner of
curious things. But whenever Alice looked
hard at any shelf, to make out exactly what
it had on it, that particular shelf was always
quite empty.
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
Introduction and Summary
Of the several dozen published studies of market structure
and performance in banking, ten have concerned the relation between con-
centration and checking-account prices. Of these ten, three reported
statistically significant positive re2ations at the 5 percent level,
the strongest relation being such that a ten-percent increase in concen-
tration accompanies a two-percent increase in price. The other seven
found positive but statistiCally insignificant relations. Nevertheless,
the findings are generally Viewed as support for Structure-Conduct-
Performance theory from which the hypothesis of a posittve relation de-
rives [7]. (See [5] for a different view.)
*Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
**Miami University. Oxford. Ohio.- 2 -
All ten of these studies use proxies of one kind or another
in place of actual prices. Wondering, therefore, bow much the findings
owe to the proxies, we obtained the actual checking-account prices from
154 Texas banks. We found four things.
1. The correlation between proxy and price is so low that
even the best proxy accounts for only 18 percent of the variations in
price.
2. Within a 'town (which is -always part of the "local marketII
hypothesized by the S-C-P theory) the highest price is from 1.76 to 2.62
times the lowest, depending on the town. The theory, however, implies
that price is the same or nearly the same everywhere in a market, as
all the banks there feel the same competitive forces, which the theory
identifies ~th concentration.
3. Prices tend to a higher average in towns where they are
more various. The theory, however, predicts the opposite; it attributes
high prices to conscious collusion or "parallel action," which, if follow-
ed, would reduce rather than increase the price dispersion.
4. While regression analysis of the sample produces the usual
positive but insignificant coefficients for the Herfindahl index when the
proxies are used, it produces a negative (but still insignificant) coeffi-
cient when~actual prices are used. Moreover, the R2,s and F-ratios of the
price equations are substantially lower than those of the proxy equations
while the coefficients (on control variables) that are statistically signi-
ficant in the price equations are insiginificant in the proxy equations and
vice versa.- 3-
1. Relations Between Price and Proxies
The service in question is the processing of n checks per month
together with the associated bookkeeping and reporting. The price is the
minimum cost that the depositor must pay for t.herservdce, At most banks
it has an explicit and an implicit part. The explicit part consists of
the purchase cost of blank checks, a per-item processing fee, and a monthly
service charge. The third of these explicit costs, and at some banks the
second as well, depends on the unused ba.lance in the account. The monthly
explicit cost is therefore a function of the number of checks and the un-
used balance, say E(n.B), where B is the balance.
The implicit part of the price is the opportunity cost of main-
taining the unused balance; it reflects the posttax yield obtainable from
an investment of comparable risk and liquidity. here taken to be 4 percent
per year or .33 percent per month.* The monthly implicit cost is there-
fore .0033B.
For a given value of n. the sum E(n.B) + .0033B is minimized by
a balance B(n). By definition. the price Pln) is the minimum cost.
P(n) =E[n,B(n)] + .0033B(n).••
*In [6]. which reports the prices from a part of the sample.
the implicit cost rate was taken as 6 percent per year. the authors having
overlooked the need to take its after-tax equivalent for proper combination
with the explicit charge.
**See the appendix for an illustrative calculation._ 4 -
We do Dot distinguish between minimum and average balances because
the depositor could time his deposits and withdrawals so as to maintain a
constant balance B(n). in which case the minimum and average balances coincide.
The depositor may, of course, choose to allow his balance to fluctuate, per~
mitting the average to differ from the minimum, in which case he might pay
something for the extra services of convenience and storage. But these must
be distinguished from the basic checking-account service, which is to process
checks.
At only a few of the sample banks is price per check independent
of the number processed. In general, each bank has a price schedule rather
than a single price. Of course, only a small portion of this schedule is
relevant to a given depositor, who, writing between 20 and 30 checks per
month, for example, need not consider the prices associated with fewer than
20 or more than 30 checks.
Few depositors know exactly how many checks they will write in a
month. This uncertainty may lead a depositor to keep an unused balance that
proves, at the end of the month, to be too large or too small to minimize his
cost. But his uncertainty lies in the amount of the service he will wish to
buy, not in the price that he will pay for a given amount. The price is
definite.
All of the S-C-P studies have used proxies for prices.* The most
popular proxy is the service-charge revenue per dollar of demand deposits,
an easily obtained number that does not, however, share the conceptual
*See [4] for detailed criticisms of all the proxies.- 5 -
characteristics of price (for reasons explained by Boyd [1J). Since
the S-C-P tradition willingly tolerates conceptual defects if they
lead to empirical results, the implicit assumption must be that the
proxy correlates well with price. In fact, however, it correlates
poorly. The calculated correlation coefficient between this proxy and
P(20), for instance, is -.04, with a 99 percent confidence interval of
[-.25, .18]. The correlation is not significantly different from zero,
and even if the true value lies at the upper bound of the confidence
interval the proxy explains less than three percent of the variations
in price.
A related proxy is the service-charge revenue per demand
account. This shares the: main conceptual defects of the first proxy
and correlates even less well with price. The calculated correlation
coefficient between it and P(20) is -.07. with a 99 percent confidence
interval of [-.28•.14J.
The best of the proxies is the explicit service charge for
a checking account with specified characteristics--usually twenty debits
and two credits per month. $200 average balance. and $100 minimum
balance. The problem with this proxy is tha.t the specified balance
might not be optimal for depositors who write twenty checks. Indeed,
at only thirteen of our 154 sample banks is it so. The proxy therefore
misspecifies the prices of the remaining 141 banks. The calculated cor-
relation coefficient between this proxy and P(20) is .42, with a 99 per-
cent confidence interval of [.22, .57J. The correlation therefore differs
significantly from both zero and one. Even if the true value were at the
upper bound of .57, however, variations in the proxy would explain only
about a third of the variations in price.- 6 -
It is noteworthy that two of the three studies which obtained
a statistically significant relation between concentration and price
used as a proxy the service-charge revenue per dollar of deposits, for
which the correlation with actual price is not significantly different
from zero. The third used the service-charge revenue per account, which
is even worse.*
On the fundamental econometric principle that no economic
meaning can be attached to a statistical relation unless the underlying
equation has been specified correctly, no conc~usions about the structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis can be drawn from these three studies. In-
deed, the same is true of the seven studies that found no statistical
significance. The proxy-based findings simply do not bear on the question.
We therefore offer further analysis of our sample.
*A recent article [3] reports statistical significance vith the
better proxy (explicit service charge on an account with specified character-
istics) together vith a new hypothesis about the relation between concentration
and price: Concentration affects price only when it lies between Lower- and
upper critical values, the latter of which was estimated to be .099 for the
Herfindahl index. Because of this new hypothesis the findings deserve separate
treatment, which one of us provides in another paper.- T -
2. Intra-Market Price Variations
The structure-conduct-performance theory states that a given
local market's prices are partially determined by the strength of its
competitive forces as represented by concentration. Since on this view
the competitive:forces acting on all banks in one market are the same,
the degree of competition operating in a market should relate to a
market price, as opposed to individual bank prices. And indeed, studies
using market variables obtain "be't'tier-" results than those which take
individUal banks as the units of observation. If the underlying theory
is sound. however, the prices charged by individual members of a banking
market should cluster around a llmarket price", and the two approaches
would yield consistent results.
A striking characteristic of the 23 Texas towns fully covered
by our sample is the wide range of prices found within towns.* AIthough
a town may not constitute a "local marketIt , the empirical work has
invariably identified local markets with political or geographic regions
equal to or larger than a town, so that a town is always part of a market.
Hence the intratown variations represent· lower bounds for intra-market
differences. Figure 1 illustrates how greatly prices can differ in a
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Fig. 1. Prices in a 3-bank town.- 9 -
is 2.12 times the lowest. This factor ranges from 1.76 for 3-bank towns
to 2.62 for towns with 6 to 10 banks. Such large differences in prices
are inexplicable within the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm,
which, moreover. cannot suggest a meaning for the concept of a market
price when the differences exist. Is it the median? tbe mode? the
arithmetic mean? the geometric or yet some other mean? In order to
answer, the theory would need to predict the distribution of prices, and
for this it would have to abandon the representation of competitive
conditions by local-market Concentration. That representation necessarily
imputes identical competitive environments to all the firms in the market
and so cannot predict a nondegenerate price distribution.
3. Relation between Means and Variances
The hypothesis that bank performance declines as concentration
increases rests onrtbe more fundamental hypothesis that banks in the more
concentrated markets can more easily coordinate their actions, by tacit
or explicit collusion, in order to keep prices high and realize greater
profits. The poor performance, measured-by h~gh prices, is therefore a
direct result of tacit or explicit collusion.
If high prices indeed indicated collusive agreement then they
should be rather homogeneous; otherwise, it is hard to see wherein the
agreement lies. Equally, if relatively homogeneous prices issued from
collusion, they would tend to be high rather than low. According to
the theory, then, prices should be more homogeneous--less variable--
in those towns where their average is higher. That is, town means and
variances should be negatively correlated.- 10 -
Among the twenty-three towns fully covered by our sample,
however. means and variances are positively correlated. The simple
correlation coefficients pertaining to twelve, twenty.rour, and
thirty-six checks per month are respectively .52, .43, and .43.
These relations are if anything strengthened by controlling for inter-
town differences in wage rates. the main factor that might save the
theory. The partial correlation coefficients (net of wage effects)
are respectively .52, .56, and .52, all significantly above zero at
the five percent level. (The 1 statistics, with twenty degrees of
freedom, are respectively 2.71,3.01, and 2.71.)
4. Regressions
Adherents of the S-C-P paradigm seem to believe that many
small non-negative regression results must cumulate to en-dmpcr'tant
positive relation between price and concentration. Since this relation
could presumably be documented by SUitably refined techniques, the
existing body of evidence, weak though it is, is viewed as favorable
to the theory. It is therefore interesting to find that the combination
of our data with the empirical approach used in the best previous research
yields negative coefficients on the concentration measure.
Heggestad and Mingo's study [2J is one of the better research
efforts so we adopted their specification as a model--with two alterations.
First, we deleted a variable (the percentage of demand deposits in accounts
under $1,000) that is expensive to measure and for which they obtained
only insignificant coefficients. Second, we added a variable to control- 11 -
•
for cost differentials between markets. For this purpose we used the
wages of check-file clerks, proof-machine operators, and telephone
operators in each market. The regressors used, in addition to a
concentration measure, were therefore:
TO: Total deposits of the bank (thousands of dollars);
IG: ratio of 1974 to 1971 personal income in the market;
PI: per capita personal income in the market, 1974 (dollars);
DS: the bank's share of total deposits in the market (%);
RD: ratio of demand to total deposits in 'tbe bank (%);
WG: average low-skilled wage rate (dollars per year).
Feasibility considerations persuaded us to approximate markets
by counties (which in" our sample largely coincide with SMSA's where these
2 exist) while the superior performance (in terms of R and F) of the
Herfindahl index over the other concentration indexes leads us to report
only the regressions in which it was used.
Because of the nonlinear price schedules. the regressions
were run using the price (in dollars per month) of writing n checks.
for n = 6. 20, 42. and 84. as dependent variables. All estimates are
obtained by ordinary least squares for comparability with previously
published results.
As shown in Table 1. the R2
I S are abysmal. even for studies
of this type. It is noteworthy that while the R2,s for the regressions
using actual price range from .04 to .16. they jump to .22 and .30 whenTable 1. Regression Coefficients and (In Parentheses) Their
Standard Errors
Dependent Variable Intercept ,INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Herfindahl ~'~ rG PI ps RP WG R2
F
p(6) .79 -.67 ~(10-7) .52 4(10-5$ .23 -.39 8.5(10;5) . 043 .943
(.65) ( .46) (6.6(10-7» (.41) (6(10- » ( .40) (.55) (7(10- ))
P(20) 2.91** -.786 2.7(10-7) -.350 .0002** .942 -1.14 -.0003** .127 3.02*;
( .846) ( . 595) (8.6(10-7H (.534) ( .00008) (.526) (.720) ( .00009)
P(42) 5.27** -1.01 6.5(10-7) -1.16 .0004** 1.31 -1.96 -.0005** .156 3.86*;
(1.34) (.940) (1.3(10-6 » ( .844) (.0001) (.831) (1.14) (.0001)
p(84) 8.19** -.750 7(10-7). -2.17 .0007** 1.1,2 -3.39 -.0007** .129 3.09*;
(2.26) (1. 59) (2(10-6» (1.43) (.0002) 1.41) (1.93) (. 0002)
Service-charge re-
-.03* .004 _7(10-8)•• .026** 2.5(10-6) •.004 -.035** 2.8(10-6) .304 9.09*' venue per deposit
(2(10-8)) (1.4(10-6» (1.6(10-6» dollar (a proxy) ( . 015) ( .011) (.009) .009 . 012
Service-charge
-.030 -.006 _7(10-8)*. .030* 6.5(10-7) -.006 -.030 4.8(10-6) .216 5.24*i
revenue per account
(2(10-8» (2(10-6» 2.5(10-6» (a proxyIt ( . 023) ( .015) .015 ( .014) ( .019)
t 141 observations
* Significant at the 5% level
,* Significant at the 1% level- 12 -
the two proxies~ service-charge revenue per deposit dollar and service-
charge revenue per account, are used as the dependent variable. The
increase in the R2,s is plainly a statistical artifact, because of
the low correlation between proxy and price. Much the same can be
said of the F-ratios.
A few other statistical artifacts may be noted. The market
share (TO) coefficient is not significant in the equations for actual
prices but is significant at the one percent level in the equations
for proxies. Personal-income growth (IG) shows essentially the same
effect. On the other hand, the coefficients of personal income (PI)
and wages (WG), never significant in the proxy equations, are signifi-
cant in three of the four real equations. Indeed, these are the only
significant coefficients in those equations. Note, however, the
unexpected sign of the wage coefficient. Such perversities are not
at all unusual in this line of work.
The most interesting results concern the coefficients of
the Herfindahl index. All of these coefficients, though insignificant
as usual, are negative in the equations for actual prices. If we were
to apply the reasoning used in support of the traditional hypothesis,
that the insignificant results indicate-the sign of a relationship
which would be statistically (and economically) significant if we
could refine our technique enough to capture it, we could conclude
that competition varies directly with the Herfindahl Index; This- 13 -
conclusion is not implausible since oompetition produces losers as
well as winners and might therefore produce the unequal market Shares
reflected in large Herfindahl indexes. It does, however, reverse both
the traditional assumption that concentration is positively related to
·price and the tr-aditional causal sequence.
5. Conclusion
The actual prices of checking accounts at 154 Texas banks
contradict the proxy-based evidence that is often cited in support
of the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. First, the proxies
bear little relation to actual prices. Second, actual prices vary
within towns to a degree that obscures the concept of a market price
affected, according to the theory, by market concentration. Third,
the variance of price is not negatively correlated with average price
as the hypothesis predicts. Fonrth, regressions using actual prices
yield much lower R2,s than those obtained with the use of price proxies,
showing that better variables weaken rather than strengthen the statis-
tical relation. Finally, the coefficients on the Herfindahl index are
negative in all the regressions, thus underlining the fallacy in thinking
that the numerous small and positive but mostly insignificant results
obtained thus far indicate the sign and causal direction of an economically
inportant relation.Appendix
Illustrative Price CalcUlation. The following offering is typical except
in price (there is no typical price). The bank offers two kinds of checking
accounts to the general public. For the "special'! account it charges $2.25
for 200 blank checks and ten cents for each check processed, imposing no
minimum balance requirement and levying no fixed monthly fee. The depositor
vriting n checks per month on this special account therefore pays s(n) dollars
per month, where
sfn) = .llln.
For the "regular" account, the bank charges the same $2.25
for 200 blank checks but imposes processing and service charges
according to the minimum balance, as shown by the following table:
, Minimum. Be.Lance Fixed Monthly # of Free Charge per
Service-charg~ Checks Addi.tional Check
be10w $400 $2.00 20 $.06
$400-$499 $1.50 20 $.06
$500-$599 $1.00 20 $.06
above $599 0 un1imited ----
---- --- ----- _.., .
Assuming a yearly opportunity cost rate of 4 percent, whence each hundred
dollars of unused balance implicitly costs 33 cents a month~ to write n checks
per month on this regular account would cost r(n,B) dollars perA-2
month when the minimum balance is B dollars:
r(n,B) = D033B + .Olln +
2 + .06(n-20) if B < 400
1.5 +.06(n-20) if 400 < B < 500
1 + .06(n-20) if 500 s B < 600
o if 600 So B
To minimize his cost for this account the depositor chooses B = B(n)
such that
r[n,B{n)] .::. r(n,B) for B > O.
Evidently,
B(n) = 600 for n ~ 0,
whence the lowest cost for the regular account is
rln,B(n)] = 1.98 + .011n.
The price, P(n). is then the minimum cost,
P(n) = min {s(n), r[n,R(n)]}
= min {.llln, 1.98 + .Olln}
=[.111n
1.98 +
if n < 20
.Olln if n > 20.
A depositor writing fewer than 20 checks per month at this
bank should use the special account, thus keeping no unused balance,A-3
while one writing 20 or more should use the regular account keeping
a $600 minimum balance.*
Data Sources. All but the prices come from the usual sources. The prices
come from the following Texas banks:
Amarillo
Amarillo National Bank
American National Bank of Amarillo
Bank of the Southwest
North State Bank
Tascosa National Bank




North Austin State Bank
Beaumont
Allied Union Bank








Texas Bank of Beaumont
Beeville
Commercial National Bank of Beeville
First National Bank of Beeville
State Bank and Trust Co.
Bellaire
First State Bank of Bellaire
Brownsville
Brownsville National Bank
First National Bank at Brownsville




Commerce National Bank of Conroe~1
Corpus, Christi
Corpus Christi Bank and Trust
Dallas
Bank of the Southwest of Dallas
Buckner State Bank
Inwood National Bank
Texas Commerce Bank--Campbell Centre NA
Denison
Citizens National Bank of Denison
El Paso
First International Bank in El Paso NA~
University Bank
Farmers Branch
Central Bank and Trust Co.
*The effect of bank pricing on the demand for money obviously






Bank of Galveston NA
Bank of the West
First Hutchings Sealy National Bank
Moody National Bank of Galveston
United States National Bank
University National Bank
Harlingen










First City Bank--Fondren Squt~1
First City Bank--Gulfgat~1
First City Bank--Medical Center NA
First City Bank--Northeast N~
First International Bank in Housto~1
First State Bank and Trust Co. of Houston













City National Bank of Laredo
International Bank of Commerce of
Laredo
Laredo National Bank
Union National Bank of Laredo
Linden
First National Bank of Linden
Longview
American Bank
East Texas Bank and Trust Co.
,Commercial National Bank of Longview
First Natioaal Bank of Longview




Bank of the West
First National Bank at Lubbock
Lubbock National Bank
Plains National Bank of Lubbock
Security National Bank of Lubbock
Texas Commerce Bank NA
Texas Bank
Lufkin
First Bank and Trust
Lufkin National Bank
Texas National Bank of Lufkin
Marshall




Commercial Bank and Trust Co.
First National Bank of Midland
The Midland National Bank
Western State Bank
Newton
First National Bank of Newton
Orange
County National Bank




First National Bank of Port Arthur
Sabine Bank
Ralls
Security State Bank and Trust Co.
San Angelo
Central National Bank of San Angelo
First National Bank of San Angelo
San Angelo National Bank of San Angelo
Southwest Bank of San Angelo ~/
Texas State Bank
West Side National Bank
San Antonio
Central Park Bank
First National Bank of S~ Antonio
Highland Park State Bank
Main Bank and Trust
Sulphur Springs
City National Bank of Sulphur Springs
Peoples National Bank of Sulphur Springs
Sulphur Springs State Bank
Temple
Citizens National Bank of Temple
First National Bank of Temple
Temple National Bank
Texas Bank and Trust of Temple
Tyler
Citizens First National Bank
Heritage National Bank
National Security Bank !,,!
Peoples National Bank of Tyler
Southside State Bank.
Tyler Bank and Trust Co.
Vernon
Bank of Vernon
Herring National Bank of Vernon
Waggoner National Bank of Vernon
Victoria
American Bank of Commerce
Bank of Victoria
First Victoria National Bank
Victoria Bank and Trust Co.
Waco
The American Bank of Waco
Citizens National Bank of Waco
Community State Bank
First National Bank of Waco
Lake Air National Bank
Texas National Bank of Waco
Westview National Bank
Waxahachie
Citizens National Bank in Waxahachie
Ellis National Bank §/
Waxahachie Bank and Trust Co.A-6
Wichita Falls
American National Bank~1
City National Bank in Wichita Falls
First-Wichita National Bank
Parker Square State Bank
Texas Bank and Trust Co. in Wichita Falls
Southwest National Bank of Wichita Falls
aBecause of data problems, these banks were not used in the
final regression shown in Table 1.•
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